The oil tanker involved in a collision near Singapore and later apprehended by Malaysian authorities had a history of suspicious behaviour and was already considered high risk, vessel analytics companies say. 

Singapore port authorities issued a search-and-rescue request on July 19 saying fires had been reported on board Hafnia Nile and Ceres I, two tankers operating near the island of Pedra Branca east of the Singapore Strait. 

It soon emerged that the two vessels had collided, and according to Malaysia’s coast guard, Ceres I – a Chinese-owned very large crude carrier sailing under the flag of São Tomé and Príncipe – had fled the scene and switched off its location transmission system. 

Malaysian authorities have since located and detained the vessel, along with two tugboats, and report finding a 17km2 oil spill believed to have been caused by the collision. 

It has subsequently emerged that Ceres I has a history of potentially suspicious behaviour, including outages or irregularities with its automatic identification system (AIS), used by vessels to transmit their location in real time. 

Byron McKinney, a director for trade finance and compliance solutions at S&P Global Market Intelligence, says the company has followed Ceres I “for some time”. 

The tanker exhibits several red flags often associated with the so-called shadow fleet, he tells GTR. It is 23 years old, has an unknown group owner and has changed flag three times in four years, while the ship and its safety management certificate have not been inspected recently.  

McKinney adds that in March 2024, the vessel appeared to loan Iranian oil while transmitting anomalous location signals. That cargo was later discharged to another ship with a suspicious trading history. 

Ceres I is also often active in waters near Malaysia known for ship-to-ship oil transfers, and though it is possible it was not carrying goods at the time of the collision, its previous cargo was likely Iranian oil, he says. 

Iran’s oil ministry issued a statement on July 20 denying the vessel was carrying Iranian crude when the incident occurred, saying: “The crude oil of neither of these damaged oil tankers was related to Iran and did not belong to Iran.” 

Windward, a Tel Aviv-headquartered vessel analytics firm, says it has designated Ceres I as “high risk” in its system since May last year. 

“The Ceres I had irregular AIS patterns at the time of the collision, as well as multiple times in the past, suggesting possible location manipulation,” it says. 

Historically, AIS outages have been flagged as a potential indicator of suspicious activity, for instance by a vessel seeking to transport goods in contravention of sanctions. 

But following closer regulatory attention to the practice, location manipulation – or AIS spoofing, where false information is transmitted by a vessel – has become increasingly prevalent as a means to avoid detection. 

“There have been 127 oil tankers engaged in AIS spoofing around the world in the past 30 days alone,” Windward says. 

“These vessels are especially dangerous – huge ships carrying enormous amounts of flammable materials and not transmitting their accurate positions while navigating crowded waterways.” 

The practice also poses a risk to banks, commodity traders and shipping companies, which may unwittingly find themselves in breach of sanctions rules due to deceptive practices at sea. 

Windward says location manipulation is growing more quickly than other deceptive shipping practices. It has detected more than 2,500 cases in just three years, and believes the “complex-to-detect behaviour is here to stay”. 

As of July 19, Singapore authorities confirmed that all 22 crew members aboard Hafnia Nile had been rescued, while all 40 on Ceres I had either been taken to safety or are accounted for.